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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows; 
1) whether the lower court erred in permitting certain 
hearsay evidence to go before the jury; 
2) whether the lower Court erred in not granting 
Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of Defendant's 
information under U.C.A. 76-5-202(9), based upon the 
evidence presented by the State in its case-in-chief, 
3) whether the lower court erred in not giving 
Defendant's requested jury instruction on reasonable doubt 
and giving a different unfairly weighted instruction on 
reasonable doubt over Defendant's objection; 
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4) whether the lower court erred in giving the State1s 
requested jury instruction of the lesser included offense of 
Second Decree Murder over the Defendant's objection; 
5) whether the evidence was insufficient beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convict the Defendant of Murder in the 
First Degree on both counts of the State's information; 
6) whether the lower court erred in not granting 
Defendant's motion for a new trial based upon the statements 
by the prosecutor made in his rebuttal and permitting the 
jury to consider Count II (U.C.A. 76-5-202(9) in rendering 
its verdict. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a criminal action in which the Defendant was 
charged pursuant to Section 76-5-202 (f) and (g) of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended), with Murder in the First 
Degree. The * matter came on for trial before the Honorable 
David E. Roth, sitting with a jury, on the 29th day of 
October, 1986. The jury rendered its verdict of guilty on 
the 14 th day of November, 1986, and the Defendant was 
sentenced to life in prison by the Honorable David E. Roth 
on November 25, 1986. The Defendant brought a motion for a 
new trial which was denied by the Honorable David E. Roth on 
December 29, 1986. The Defendant appealed the denial of a 
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new trial and conviction to this Court on the 20th day 01 
January, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The body of Piti Srisa-ad was found along Larsen Lane 
in Weber County, State of Utah on the early morning of May 
16, 1986. (R-14 ) 
Through police investigation, James Smith was arrested 
on May 28, 1986 and made an initial statement to the police 
on that date. In this confession, he stated that Brad 
Bromage, Lloyd Averett and himself were the parties 
responsible for the death of Piti Srisa-ad, and further 
indicated that it was Lloyd Averett who actually fired the 
shot that killed Piti Srisa-ad. (R656). At some later date, 
Smith changed his story and told the police that it was he 
who killed Piti Srisa-ad. He told them that he had acted 
alone, but that he was "hired" by the Defendant, Richard S. 
Johnson to kill the decedent. 
The Defendant, Richard S. Johnson, was arrested on June 
18, 1986 and charged with Capital Murder under Sections 
76-5-202 (f) and (g) pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 
1953, (as amended). The Defendant was brought to trial on 
the 29th day of October, 1986. 
The State called, as one of their first witnesses, 
Brook Evertsen, a Salt Lake City life insurance salesman who 
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testified that he had known Rick Johnson since 1983 and had 
written a number of group health and life insurance policies 
on the Defendant through the Defendant's employer and the 
Defendant individually. He mentioned that the Defendant had 
allowed these group policies to lapse. (R-268-269) . 
Evertsen further testified that the most recent life 
insurance policy he had written for the Defendant was in 
October of 1986. This policy was originally for One Million 
($1,000,000.00) Dollars but was later changed to a Five 
Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollar policy. 
Additionally, Evertson testified that the Defendant's 
car had been stolen and that, the Defendant, had received an 
insurance settlement and was going to use Ten Thousand 
($10,000.00) Dollars of the proceeds to open up a body shop 
with Piti Srisa-ad in Ogden, Utah. (R 272). 
He indicated that in January of 1986, he, Srisa-ad, and 
the Defendant met at Sandy's diner in Ogden, to discuss the 
proposed body shop business and the requisite insurance that 
would be needed to open up the shop (R 301) Srisa-ad said 
that he wanted the insurance which was the same type that 
the Defendant had applied for in October of 1985 (R 302) . 
Evertsen sold Srisa-ad a similar policy. An accidental 
death benefit rider was discussed at this meeting and 
Srisa-ad decided at this time that he wanted the b^iv^its. 
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Cvertsen indicated howe^ ^  , that the reason it appeared 
later than the actual policy was that he, Evertsen, made the 
mistake of not marking the proper box on the application 
form. (R363-304). Evertsen admitted on cross examination, 
that it was he who signed Piti's signature to the form after 
Srisa-ad gave him authorization over the telephone. (R-292) 
At this initial meeting, it was discussed among the 
parties and decided upon, that the Defendant would initially 
make the premium payments for Srisa-ad, and the business, 
which was named R.J. Corvettes, would be the beneficiary. 
This would change when Srisa-ad started producing income 
from his efforts with the body shop; then he would name his 
own beneficiary and the Defendant would match the 
contribution that Srisa-ad made to the policy. (R 276) . 
Evertsen further explained that a lot of times, the reason 
for naming a business as beneficiary in a policy such as the 
Defendants1 is to reimburse the business for any expenses 
incurred by the business in regard to the employment of the 
deceased, and when the expenses were met, the balance of the 
death benefit would be paid to the family of the deceased 
employee (R 2 77) . 
Evertsen further testified that shortly after James 
Smith was arrested for the murder of Piti Srisa-ad, that it 
was he, Evertsen, that prepared the claim form for the 
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death benefits, and gave it to the Defendant to sign and it 
was he who mailed the claim on June 9, 1987. (R287). 
The State next called as a witness, Detective Shane 
Minor of the Ogden Police Department, it was he who arrested 
the Defendant on June 18, 1987 in connection with the death 
of Piti Srisa-ad. (R 802) 
Detective Minor testified that the Defendant told him 
that Srisa-ad was going to be working for him in his body 
shop business (R 806) and that he did have an insurance 
policy on Srisa-ad. Detective Minor further testified in 
regard to his questioning of the Defendant about the 
insurance claim. The State asked Minor the following: 
Q: Did you ever ask him if he was going to get 
the money on the insurance policy on Pitifs death? 
A: He told me - - I asked him if he had signed a 
piece of paper that would be a claim for the 
insurance company to pay off on it. He told me 
that R.CT. Corvette was the beneficiary on the 
insurance policy. And he said that he had, but he 
didmft think that it would be effective because if 
Piti was under the influence of drugs, it would 
void out the insurance policy. (R 807-808). 
Next, the State called Shari Vosper, the fiance1 of the 
Defendant at the time of Srisa-adfs death and at the time of 
his arrest on June 18, 1987. (R463). Vosper testified that 
in the latter part of March, 1986, the Defendant, in 
proposing to her, told her that he loved her and had told 
her that he wanted her to know about his past invor^ ent 
with cocaine, but thai he wanted nothing more to do wit-
drugs. (R 470). 
Also, on cross examination, Vosper testified that 
Srisa-ad was on the list of people to invite to she and the 
Defendant's wedding (R 472) and that the Defendant was with 
her when the news of Srisa-ad's death was broadcast on 
television. (R-475). She further stated that the Defendant 
appeared to be shocked when he saw the news item and 
immediately got up to call the Srisa-ad family.(R 476). 
Vosper also indicated that she was going to be the 
secretary for R.J. Corvettes (R 465) and that the Defendant 
was actively engaged in his body shop business at the time 
of his arrest in that he was working on a pick-up belonging 
to Srisa-ad's stepfather, Mr. Snook. (R-476) . 
The State's star witness James Smith was called. When 
giving his initial statement, he admitted telling the 
officers, "I'll tell you what happened but if they find 
out, they'll kill me and my family." (R716). He then changed 
his story the following day, implicating the Defendant, 
Richard Johnson, and absolving Averett and Bromage. (It is 
interesting to note, this was the same day in which Bromage 
was arrested for impersonating a police officer and also 
booked into the Weber County Jail.) 
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Smith further admitted in his testimony that he told 
the police officers in his initial statement that Bromage, 
Averett and himself discussed killing Srisa-ad at Bromage!s 
house on May 15, 1986 and they then carried out their plan 
the next night, with all three of them being in Smith's car, 
and Averett shooting Srisa-ad from the back seat. 
(R716-718). 
Smith also admitted selling marijuana and cocaine for 
Bromage for about two (2) months prior to the killing and 
had made about $30,000.00 for Bromage from these sales. 
(R-798). Smith indicated that he had been smoking marijuana 
and smoking cocaine with Bromage about every other day 
having started in the middle of April of 1986. (R-660). 
Smith admitted to changing his story and testified that 
the Defendant requested that he kill Srisa-ad because 
Srisa-ad had narced on somebody and big drug people wanted 
Srisa-ad dead. (R 636) , and also that Srisa-ad owed the 
Defendant a $70,000.00 debt. (R 767) • 
In regard to the actual killing. Smith testified he had 
shot Piti Srisa-ad in the early morning hours of May 16, 
1986, when driving around with him looking for a supposed 
drug dealer's home. 
Further Smith testified: 
"... and I looked to the left and he followed me. 
And I looked t.e m e right. And when I looked to 
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the right, he followed my head, too, and I pulled 
the gun out..." 
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 then I pulled the gun out and I shot him in the 
head..." 
"He just fell forward".(R-648). 
Despite indicating the he was "high" on cocaine that 
right and that he was not acting in his right mind and 
hadnft been rational in some period of time because of his 
constant use of cocaine (R-778), Smith testified that he 
would receive a customized Corvette worth between $45,000.00 
and $50,000.00; 1/4 pound of cocaine worth between 
$7,000.00 and $8,000.00; $3,000.00 in cash, a brand new 
house worth between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00, plus the 
R.J. Corvette auto body business three months after killing 
Srisa-ad. (R-759-760) . 
Finally, Smith testified that he "had" to kill the 
victim because the Defendant threatened him and said that if 
Smith did not do it, then Smith and his family, Averett and 
his family, and Bromage and his family would all be killed, 
making a total of 13 to 15 killings if the "job" of killing 
Piti Srisa-ad was not done. 
Brad Bromage, another principle player, was called to 
the stand next. He was granted immunity by the State for 
all drug transactions, but despite this grant of immunity, 
Bromage denied much of his large scale drug involvement 
contrary to testimony of Smith's and also of Kevin Wakely 
another of the State's witnesses (R-798, R-1343), who's home 
the victim was in prior at his death, Bromage testified 
that the Defendant discussed killing Srisa-ad five or six 
times during the month of March of 1986. He also said that 
when such discussions were taking place they were usually 
using cocaine and/or alcohol. (R-524, R-530) 
Additionally, Bromage testified he was to receive 1/4 
pound of cocaine and $3,000.00 to kill Srisa-ad (R-522) but 
his relationship with the Defendant was severed by the first 
week of April, 1986, as a result of a falling out between 
the two because Bromage accused the Defendant of stealing 
his $1,900.00 of his drug stash money when Bromage was out 
of town. (R-523,R-524,R-555). 
Lloyd Averett was the next to testify, he said that he 
was a friend of Brad Bromage for fifteen (15) years (R-527) 
and that he had met the Defendant, Rick John^^ , 
approximately 3-4 months preceding the murder of Piti 
Srisa-ad. (R-574). He also testified that the Defendant 
offered him $6,000.00, a 1/4 pound of cocaine and a 
customized Corvette to do the killing of Piti Srisa-ad 
after Brad Bromage and the Defendant had severed their 
relationship and those two were no longer discussing the 
killing. (R-576) Further, Lloyd Averett indicated that it 
was he who brought Smith into the arrangement to kill 
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Srisa-ad and that he and Smith were to split the payoff. 
(R-576). 
Averett indicated that he had a change of heart and 
that he went to the FBI and told them of the plan to kill 
Srisa-ad four days prior to the death of Piti Srisa-ad. 
(R-583) . (Although he never told Smith that he had this 
change of heart or mentioned to him that he was going to the 
FBI.) Averett claimed he went to the FBI because the 
Defendant, a foot or more or shorter and at least 85 pounds 
lighter, had threatened his life and that he was scared of 
him. (R-596-597). 
It is interesting to note that the State, in its' 
rebuttal, even concedes that Averett is somebody you do not 
want to meet in a dark alley and i^s obviously the kind of 
person you would approach to have him kill someone. 
(R-1804). 
The next witness the State called was Kevin Wakely. 
Wakely testified that he and Smith were selling large 
amounts of cocaine for Bromage (R-1343) and that Bromage was 
trying to take over Srisa-ad's connections. (R-1366). He 
testified that he had seen Srisa-ad at Bromagefs residence 
almost every day preceding Srisa-ad!s death, (R-1354) and 
that on the night of Srisa-ad's death, Bromage and Averett 
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came to his house when only he, Smith, and Srisa-ad, were 
there. 
He also testified that shortly after Srisa-adfs death, 
Bromage "beat up" Wakely telling him not to tell the cops 
about his impersonating an Officer when he was trying to 
scare Srisa-ad. (R-1362-1363) . Wakely explained that 
Bromage made threats against he and his children if Wakely 
told the police about Bromage's actions with Srisa-ad. 
(R-1363). 
The most startling of all testimony, was that by the 
victim1s mother, through Stipulation, Pairat Snook testified 
that Brad Bromage came to her residence, looking for her 
son, Piti, three (3) times between the end of April and the 
first week in May". He possessed a police Officer's badge 
and demanded to see Piti Srisa-ad and then left angrily 
after he was told that Piti wasMiot there. (R-8 93). Bromage 
continually denied that this ever happened during the trial. 
In regard to the physical evidence, the State called 
Dr. Armondo Salazar of the State Medical Examiners Office to 
testify concerning the autopsy he performed on the decedent, 
Piti-Srisa-ad. (R-250-267). He observed that the bullet 
had entered the victim's head, travelled from left to right, 
front to back and slightly downward, at approximately 
fifteen (15°) degrees from the horizontal. (R-259,260) . He 
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also concluded that powder stippling indicated that the 
muzzled weapon was between 6f to 12f inches from the victim 
at the time of discharge. (R-255). 
Dr. Salazar also testified to the recent ingestion of 
cocaine by Srisa-ad (R-264), which corresponded to the 
testimony of others. That this testimony being that Srisa-ad 
used cocaine at Kevin Wakely's house when Bromage, Averett 
and Smith were all present. (R-1360). 
The defense called Dr. Todd Gray of the State Medical 
Examiners Office and he testified that it was his opinion, 
that the distribution of the powder stippling " on the 
victim's head, indicated that the bullet did not pass 
between anything after leaving the gun and striking the 
victim's head. (R-876). He also testified briefly with 
respect to blood splatter and "blow back", a phenomenon 
which occurs when a bullet strikes the body and fragments of 
blood and matter came back towards the direction from which 
the bullet traveled. (R-878). 
The defense offered, as evidence, a styrofoam head 
wherein Dr. Gray had inserted a bicycle spoke, showing the 
trajectory of the bullet as it entered the victim's head. 
(R-877). 
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Mark Plaskon, a criminalogist with specicil training in 
bloodstain pattern interpretation (R-1249,1250) testified as 
to what bloodstain pattern interpretation is: 
In crimes of violence, it is the rule, rather than 
the exception, that blood will inevitably be shed. 
When this blood is shed, it will tell you a 
certain story. To go in and examine the stains, 
evaluate how they have occurred, and then put them 
together to do a reconstruction, that is what is 
considered to be blood stain pattern 
interpretation. I am interpretating what the 
blood stains are telling me as the result of their 
size, distribution in an area, whether it be on 
the wall, on the ceiling, wherever blood is found. 
You examine all the stains to determine what 
occurred at the moment the blood stains shed. 
(R-1254). 
Plaskon testified that gunshot wounds create high 
velocity impact splatter and that blood will travel well 
over five feet when high velocity impact occurs. (R-1501) 
The defense offered as evidence an examination done by 
Plaskon of Smithfs vehicle. In examining the vehicle where 
James Smith claimed he shot Srisa-ad, (R-648), Plaskon 
testified that he examined the entirety of the interior of 
the vehicle and that there was no evidence of high velocity 
impact splatter. (R-1503). Plaskon indicated that because 
no evidence of high velocity impact splatter was present, 
then it was improbable that the shooting occurred in Smith's 
car. (R-1503) He also concluded that it was improbable that 
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a shooting had occurred with the victim in a seated 
position, (R-1526) as Smith had described. 
Plaskon testified that the removal of the seat cover 
would make no difference in regard to his findings because 
high velocity impact splatter would travel up to five (5) 
feet from the point of origin and he would expect it to be 
present in other areas, such as the headliner of the car if 
a shooting occurred in the car. (R-1529). 
After the defense rested, the State, in their Rebuttal 
argument indicated to the jury, for the first time, that 
Brad Bromage had been given immunity in regard to the death 
of Piti Srisa-ad and in regard to prior drug dealings. This 
was a misstatement of what actually the State had granted 
Bromage. The prosecutor said: 
Brad Bromage could have said I did it, I am the 
one who did it. I could not have charged him. I 
have granted immunity. That is permanent and 
lasting." (R-1879). 
It is the defense's contention that this statement is 
in conflict to the evidence presented by the State and also 
the testimony given by Brad Bromage. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The hearsay statements which were admitted into 
testimony a conspiracy theory were prejudicial to the 
defendant and should not have been admitted. 
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The Court further erred in not allowing the defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, part b, of the State's information. This 
part should have been dismissed as this Section was 
improperly equated with pecuniary gain under Section (f) , of 
76-5-202, and because the mens rea of the Defendant is 
different than that of what is required under the Statute. 
The trial Court did notinclude the Defendant's 
proposed jury instruction on reasonable doubt, and as such, 
the jury instructions were unfairly weighted towards the 
conviction of the Defendant. 
The Court further erred in admitting into jury 
instructions, the lower included offense of Second Degree 
Murder. The State, nor the defendant, never advanced any 
theory, nor could any inferences be drawn that the defendant 
was guilty of Second Degree Murder. 
The jury was without sufficient evidence to support the 
Defendant's conviction in that the testimony which was 
offered, was inherently unreliable in that the witnesses 
testifying against the Defendant Tla4^  motives to testify 
falsely against the Defendant. 
In the State's rebuttal' argufnent the prosecutor 
misstated the evidence concerning the immunity granted to 
Brad Bromage in regard to the murder of Piti Srisa-ad, and 
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as such, the misstatement vested Brad Bromage's testimony 
with greater credibility. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OF A 
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY RELATING TO THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF COCAINE 
The State initially sought entry of testimony from John 
Montoya about a drug conspiracy (R-351) and there after when 
David Wardrop was testifying, the Defendant again objected 
whereupon the Court heard the argument regarding the 
admissibility of such statements and ruled such statements 
were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). (R-358-395). 
Specifically, the Defendant argued as follows whereupon 
the Court made its ruling: 
Mr. Perkins: It is hearsay. It is based upon 
hearsay, but it is relevancy too. It is hearsay 
first off because these are statements made out of 
court, not by Mr. Johnson, the Defendant. And 
they are statements, a lot of which are being made 
by the decedent, which is different from in State 
v. Gray. Everyone—I don't see any mention of 
anyone being deceased in State vs. Gray, which is 
a different situation also. There is no way to 
ascertain the reliability of the statements that 
were made at the time, especially under certain 
circumstances they have made mention of while they 
are using cocaine. There is no way to test 
reliability of those statements. 
So there is a number of different factors 
that make it hearsay. And then even if the Court 
overrules on the hearsay, it is not relevant to 
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the criminal homicide charge which Mr, Johnson 
faces. 
The Court: I don't buy the relevance 
argument. It can be relevant if it is admissible. 
It will be admissible if you satisfy me that the 
Defendant was Involved in the conspiracy to import 
and distribute " drugs. You d what you can with 
this witness. I think Mr. Montoya took you most 
of the way in that direction. He has testified 
that he saw these four people together, and that 
would be Mr. Srisa-ad, Rick Johnson, Randy Johnson 
and Scott Tarren, together probably six times. He 
saw the Defendant, Rick Johnson, about 15 or 20 
times during a time when he was selling cocaine. 
That some of the others gave him cocaine to sell. 
He doesn't say Mr. Johnson did. He has testified 
concerning statements made by the Defendant, Rick 
Johnson, as to where it came from. And there is 
evidence that Mr. Johnson knew what was going on 
and what the transactions were, what the details 
were. See what this witness knew about it. 
The leading Utah case on Rule 801(d)(2)(E), is State 
vs. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah, 1986). In State vs. Gray, 
cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
To utilize the exception, the State must introduce 
evidence independent and exclusive of the 
conspirator's hearsay statements themselves, 
showing the existence of a criminal joint venture 
and the Defendant's participation therein. 
Independent evidence of the declarant's membership 
in the criminal venture is also required. 
"Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own 
bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." 
In the instant proceeding, testimony by the 
"participants" in the "cocaine distribution conspiracy", was 
not supported by any evidence independent and exclusive of 
the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves and should 
not have been received without such independent evidence. 
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Add:ixonaily, the purported participan.s, (Scott 
Tarran, David Wardrop, John Montoya, Randy Johnson and Rick 
Johnson) all testified the "cocaine conspiracy" was 
terminated by the end of January, 1986. Tarran testified he 
moved home the end of January, 1986 and the arrangement had 
ended. (R-444) . Randy Johnson testified between November 
and January "the coke was all used up and any arrangements 
had ceased." (R-934-935). David Wardrop testified he 
stopped having dealings with Randy Johnson about after the 
first two weeks of December, 1985. 
Consequently, the drug distribution conspiracy was 
terminated by the end of January, 1986, some four months 
before the death of Piti Srisa-ad on May 16, 1986. 
Interestingly, Tarran testified the business lasted 
about three days and after which it had turned into nothing 
more than partying for himself, Randy Johnson, Piti Srisa-ad 
and the Defendant Rick Johnson. (R-455-456). 
Yet, the Court permitted such evidence to be admitted 
by virtue of its ruling referred to hereinabove. 
(R-394-395). 
Consequently, considerable hearsay statements were 
received into evidence relating to a criminal conspiracy to 
distribute drugs between November, 1985, and January, 1986 
when in fact, the Defendant was on trial for hiring James 
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Smith to kill Piti Srisa-ad for an insurance policy on tho 
life of Piti Srisa-ad and as such, this evidence should not 
have been received as non-hearsay in that this evidence has 
nothing to do with a conspiracy to commit murder. 
Brad Bromage claims Richard Johnson approached him in 
March, 1986, to do a job on Piti Srisa-ad (R-524) , two 
months after the "conspiracy" had terminated. 
It is further submitted admitting such evidence as 
non-hearsay of a drug conspiracy which was terminated and 
concluded approximately four months prior to the death of 
Piti Srisa-ad was not sufficiently reliable or relevant to 
justifiably admit into evidence and in its admission, 
prejudiced the Defendant. 
Point II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 76-5-202(f) OF THE STATE'S 
INFORMATION 
At the conclusion of the Statefs case, the Defendant 
motioned the Court to dismiss Count (f) of the State's 
information charging Defendant as follows: 
Said Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the 
death of Piti Srisa-ad under the following 
circumstances: (f) the homicide was committed for 
pecuniary or other personal gain, (R-l, R-825-826) 
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In the instant proceeding, according to the testimony 
of James Smith, the Defendant hired him to kill Piti 
Srisa-ad for one-quarter (1/4) pound of cocaine, worth about 
$7,000.00, $3,000.00 cash, a customized Corvette worth 
$45,000.00 to $50,000.00, a new house worth $75,000.00 to 
$100,000.00 and Defendants body shop business three (3) 
months after the deed was done. (R 759-760) 
The Court denied such motion to dismiss paragraph 
(b) of the information, stating: 
The Defendant's motion is denied. The evidence at 
this point would support a finding that the 
Defendant hired somebody to cause the death of the 
victim for pecuniary gain, being to collect the 
insurance. (R 591-592) 
Under Count (b), the Defendant by information was 
charged with intentionally or knowingly causing the death of 
Piti Srisa-ad for pecuniary or other personal gain. From 
the testimony, the caused death was a gunshot wound to the 
head (R 253) which Smith testified he fired when he and the 
victim were stopped at a stop sign on 9th Street in Ogden, 
Utah. (R 778) 
Consequently, the Defendant could have criminal 
responsibility only under an accomplice theory as set forth 
in U.C.A. §76-2-202. U.C.A. §76-2-202 provides as follows: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for commission of the offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which 
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constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cornish, 560 P. 2d 
1134 (Utah, 19 ), held that under U.C.A. §76-2-202- "an 
accomplice is one who participates in a crime in such a way 
that he could be charged with the same offense as the 
principal Defendant," 
Similarly, in State v. Shreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
1986) , the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The test for determining whether a person is an 
accomplice to a crime is whether the person could 
be charged with the same offense as the Defendant, 
The initial question thus presented is whether or rot 
James Smith is a principal under U.C.A, §76-5-202(f), more 
specifically, did James Smith intentionally or knowingly 
cause the death of Piti Srisa-ad for pecuniary or other 
personal gain. Smith testified ne would receive 
remuneration from the Defendant pursuant to an agent or 
contract for killing Piti Srisa-ad (R 759-760) for which the 
legislature specifically enacted U.C.A. 76-5-202 (g). 
The Legislature, by specifically denoting "contracts 
for remuneration", a First Decree Murder offense and 
specifically denoting "homicides for pecuniary or other 
personal gain", a First Degree Murder offense and having 
done so one right after the other in its seventeen (17) 
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different categui. tes has thereby established such catey.ii-t. 
as being different. 
Thus, the remuneration referred to under section (g) 
should not be equated with pecuniary gain under section (f) 
of U.C.A. §76-5-202. 
Consequently, the mens rea of James Smith and the 
Defendant on this count of the informant are different and 
the State adduced no evidence to the contrary and such count 
should have been dismissed. 
Interestingly, the State never advanced on accomplice 
theory but rather contended that the Defendant hired Smith 
to kill Piti Srisa-ad for the insurance proceeds. 
Neither the State, the Defendant, nor the Court, 
requested or suggested an "accomplice" instruction for 
U.C.A. 76-5-202(f) in light of the Court's ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss such count at the conclusions 
of the State's case. Such misconception coupled with the 
differing intents of Smith and the Defendant, this count 
should have been dismissed. 
Point III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
The prosecution's burden of proof in any criminal case, 
whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial or a 
combination of both, is that beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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State vs. Lamb, Utah 606 P2d 229 (1980). Hence, it is 
important that when the jury is advised of their duties, 
they must also be advised as to "reasonable doubt" and what 
it constitutes. Because "reasonable doubt" is the 
cornerstone of the criminal justice system and the life and 
liberty of the Defendant is dependent upon this ideology, it 
is important that a correct and unbiased definition of it be 
given to the jury. 
The definition of "reasonable doubt" which was given to 
the jury in instruction Number 11, and reads: 
That degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are bound 
to act conscientiously upon it. It must arise 
from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can honestly 
say that you are not satisfied of the Defendant's 
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but, if after 
such impartial consideration and comparison of the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an 
abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt, such 
as you would be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to your own 
affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. (TR 147) 
This jury instruction gives a definition of reasonable 
doubt and then goes on to instruct when "doubt" is not 
enough to convict and when "doubt" is enough to convict. 
The instructions as to reasonable doubt did not stop here, 
however. Jury instruction Number 12, (TR 148) instructed 
the jury further, it read: 
The law a _,__-> not require demonstration of the 
degree of proof which, excluding all possibility 
of error, produces absolute certainty, for such 
degree of proof is rarely possible. Only that 
degree of proof is necessary which convinces the 
mind and directs and satisfies the conscience of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it, (R148) 
This instruction clarified "doubt" as to when it is 
enough to convict, and in doing so, clarifies it in favor of 
the prosecution as it is slanted towards conviction and not 
acquital because there is not a corresponding clause as to 
when the "doubt" is not enough. This bias is further 
evidenced by the use of words "convinces the mind" and 
"directs and satisfies the conscience", as it is used in 
connection with conviction. In essence, these instructions 
define twice what reasonable doubt is not, and only defines 
what reasonable doubt is once; and as such, prejudices the 
jury. It places emphasis on conviction and indicates to the 
jury when they should convict; but there is no parallel 
instruction instructing when and how the jury should not 
convict. 
In chambers, defense counsel asked the Court to add an 
instruction which would define to the jury what reasonable 
doubt is, the defense requested the following instruction: 
(R 1660) 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not 
a mere possible doubt, because everything relating 
to human affairs, and depending on moral evidences 
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It 
is the state of the case which after the entire 
comparison and consideration of all the evidence 
leaves the mind of the jurors in that condition 
that they cannot say they feel an abiding 
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of 
the charge. (R 1660-1661) 
Counsel asked that this instruction be inserted because 
"it is coupled as whole a definition of what reasonable 
doubt is and what it is not." (R 1660) Counsel further 
explained that this instruction would not give undue weight 
to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant as the 
instruction the court intended to insert appeared to do. The 
Court indicated that it would think about adding it. (R 
1661) 
Again in chambers, before the closing arguments were to 
be given, the Court asked if there were' any objections to 
the proposed instructions (R 1732) . Defense counsel 
indicated that, yes, he had an objection to ^these 
instructions because they did not include two of the 
instructions he had asked to be added. The Judge indicated 
that he did not include the one on reasonable doubt. (R 
1773) The defense counsel took exception to this and again 
stated his grounds for inclusion of the instruction he 
proposed, stating that the instruction, as given, was 
unfairly weighted towards a guilty conviction, and that his 
was a more accurate sumira^" of the law. (R 1733) The record 
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is silent as to 1 • jutl's reasons for not including t 
proposed instruction. 
Because of the fact that this proposed instruction was 
not given to the jury, they were not clearly and 
appropriately informed of the legal standard to be applied 
while in their deliberations, which is elaborated upon in 
State vs. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (1980). This omission of the 
proposed instruction goes even beyond State vs. McCumber, 
622 P.2d 353; (1980) and State vs. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 618 
(1969) wherein the Court held that a criminal Defendant is 
entitled to have a jury instruction on his theory of the 
case if there is any substantial evidence to justify such an 
instruction. In this case, the defense was not even asking 
for an instruction on his theory, but an instruction that 
does to the heart of all criminal proceedings, the 
definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt"; and asking that 
it not be stated in such a way as to prejudice the 
Defendant. 
Although in State vs. Wilks, 474 P.2d 733 (1970), the 
Court indicated that: 
When instructions are given which clearly and 
positively state which must be proved before a 
conviction can be had and 'the jury told that they 
must acquit unless each 'and every element is 
established by the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is not necessary to give 
another instruction in negative form. 
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The case at hand can be distinguished because of tho 
actual instructions given. There is an explanation of 
reasonable doubt which includes one instruction to the 
negative and one instruction to the positive, but when 
instruction Number 12 was given, there were then two 
instructions to the positive and only one to the negative, 
now unfairly weighing "reasonable doubt" to the prejudice of 
the Defendant. 
Of course, under Wilks, the Defendant would have no 
basis for an objection if the trial court had only included 
jury instruction Number 11 (R 147), but when the court goes 
further and includes jury inbtruction number 12 (R 144) in 
addition to instruction Number 11, and this instruction 
being in the "positive form" then it should be balanced with 
an instruction which is in the "negative form" as asked for 
by counsel. (R 1733) Hence, because of theNunbalanced jury 
instructions of positive forms, it is Defendant's contention 
that the verdict be reversed. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
PROSECUTION TO INCLUDE A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
The leading case on jury instructions, in regard to 
lesser included offenses, State v. Baker, 671 P. 2d 152 
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(1983), indicate that: there are two standards used by trial 
and appellate courts in determining when to instruct a jury 
in regard to lesser included offenses. The Court states 
that the first standard requires an analysis of the evidence 
offered at trial, and if parties request instructions, they 
are entitled to them upon their theory of the case, and any 
lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the verdict would 
support such a verdict. The second standard that the court 
mentions is that the lesser offense must be a necessary 
element of the greater offense and must of necessity be 
embraced within the legal definition of the greater offense 
and be a part thereof. 
The Baker Court goes on to say, that because of the two 
standards, there has been some confusion in the law on 
lesser included offenses. The Court explains that the 
prosecution applied the second standard to aid them in the 
prosecution of cases wherein the proof failed to establish 
some element of the crime charged, this standard was applied 
even when the actual evidence, or inferences need to 
demonstrate the elements were not included in the original 
offense charged. 
In Baker the Court found that they were persuaded that 
the "necessarily included offense" standard should be 
limited to cases where the prosecution requests the 
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instruction, and that both the legal elements and the actual 
evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements 
must necessarily be included within the original charged 
offense. The offenses must be such that the greater cannot 
be committed without necessarily having committed the 
lesser. 
In the case at hand, the trial Court allowed the 
prosecution proposed jury instruction on Second Degree 
Murder (R134)• The defense counsel objected to this 
inclusion in that it had no application as to the facts in 
the case (R1665) . The Court disagreed and allowed the 
instruction stating "that Second Degree Murder was a lesser 
included offense of First Degree Murder because one element 
of Capitol Homicide is the intentional killing, which is all 
of the elements of Second Degree Murder" (R1665). Contrary 
to what he had just ruled, the Judge goes on to say, that 
"in his opinion, there are two logical verdicts, in this 
case, guilty or not guilty, lesser includeds do not fit at 
all." (TR1667). 
It is the Defendant's contention that the "Judge's 
opinion", is correct, Second Degree Murder does not fit at 
all. If the Defendant did not "hire" Smith to do the 
killing under Section 76-5-202 (f), then Smith did the 
killing all by himself, and the Defendant did not do 
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anything at all. After cui, the question for the jury was 
to decide if the Defendant "hired" Smith. The Jury already 
knew that it was not the Defendant who killed Srisa-ad. 
There is no actual evidence or even inferences which 
were submitted by the State to concluded that the Defendant 
committed an intentional killing. The State did not advance 
the theory that the Defendant was the person doing the 
actual murder of Piti Srisa-ad. In fact, the actual 
intentional murderer, was James Smith; the State's star 
witness. The Statefs only contention was that the Defendant 
"hired" Smith to kill Piti Srisa-ad for "pecuniary gain" and 
because of these two circumstances, their theory of the 
Defendant's involvement fit under the First Degree Murder 
Statute. Before you do have a First Degree Murder 
situation, somebody must either, under (f) hire someone to 
commit a murder, or (g) murder someone for pecuniary gain. 
If these two circumstances are not present, then there is no 
first degree murder, and the State improperly asked the jury 
to consider a second degree murder situation. 
Because the jury instruction, Second Degree Murder, was 
included, the jury was prejudice towards convicting the 
defendant, and as such, the conviction should be reversed 




THE EVIDENCE, AS PRESENTED AT TRIAL, IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE 
ON BOTH COUNTS OF THE STATE'S INFORMATION 
Section 76-1-501 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as 
amended), places a burden of proof upon the State "of beyond 
a reasonable doubt" and in the absence of such proof, 
requires the Defendant be aquitted. 
Counsel is mindful of this Court's rather strict 
standards of review when, in fact, the Court is asked to 
review the records to determine the sufficiency of a 
verdict. The view is expressed in State v. Newbold, 581 
P.2d 991 (Utah 1972) wherein this Court held: "to set aside 
a jury verdict, evidence must appear so inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it 
must entertain reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed 
the crime. (Id. 972) 
In addition, the Court in State v. Home, 364 P. 2d 109 
(Utah 1961) , utilized the following language, 
"that a jury should have found the testimony of 
the only witness against the Defendant so 
inherently unprobable and unworthy of belief and 
upon objective analysis it appears that reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant was guilty." 
The case at hand falls within the perimeters that the 
Utah Supreme Court set in both Newbold and Homo in that the 
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evidence presented at this tria. is so inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt. The only 
evidence presented at that trial of the Defendant, Richard 
S. Johnson that could link him to the crime of contracting 
for the murder of Piti Srisa-ad, is uncorroborated testimony 
of a three known drug dealers and users, with as much motive 
for committing the murder of Srisa-ad as Johnson himself, 
(R- ) In this case, there is no murder weapon tying the 
Defendant to the crime; no finger prints at the crime scene; 
nor any confession or wired telephone conversations. The 
only evidence is the testimony of James Smith, the admitted 
murderer of Srisa-ad, Brad Bromage, a drug dealer originally 
accused of being involved in the murder and Lloyd Averett, 
the kind of guy that would commit a murder for hire by the 
Statefs own admission. The testimony of these men are 
replete with contradictions and are totally illogical. Not 
to mention the fact that these men have an apparent motive 
for testifying falsely against the Defendant, that being 
that they would be the first logical people to charge with 
the murder of Piti Srisa-ad. The testimony of Jim Smith is 
the most incredulous for anyone to believe. Not to mention 
the fact of his motive for testifying against Johnson, and 
that would be that if he did not testify and implicate 
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Johnson, Smith would be subject to the death penalty. (R 
724) . Jim Smith had everything to gain by blaming Piti 
Srisa-ad's death on the Defendant, including his life. 
James Smith's originally told the police that Brad 
Bromage and Lloyd Averett did the killing of Piti Srisa-ad 
and he, Smith, was just a passenger. (R 656) . However, 24 
hours later, he totally changed his story and says that he 
did the killing and that he was entirely alone. (R 656) . 
Through testimony, it was shown, that Smith changed his 
story after he saw Brad Bromage in jail. Testimony also 
indicated that Jim Smith was extremely upset after this, 
change his story and make a confession, and get a deal as 
soon as possible. (R- ). All in all, the most ridiculous 
"part of Jim Smith's testimony was the remuneration he was to 
receive from the defendant if he killed Piti Srisa-ad. 
James Smith testified that the Defendant was going to build 
him (James Smith) a brand new home worth between $75,000.00 
and $100,000.00 (R 731), give him a customized Corvette (R 
732), give him the R.J. Corvette Business (R 733), give him 
$3,000.00 in cash, (R 732) and 1/4 pound of cocaine worth 
$7,000.00 and $8,000.00 (R 732) All of these items 
together, would be well worth well over $150,000.00 (R 760) 
and almost twice what the deceased was supposed to owe the 
Defendant. (R 767) Smith's testimony is even too 
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incredulous for Smith to believe himself. Why would anyone 
pay double what was owed on the debt, and why would Smith 
not even go out to see if these items really did exist, or, 
even question if the Defendant had the ability to carry out 
the payment. 
Lastly, James Smith admits to being irrational and out 
of his mind for a period of time because of his use of 
drugs, mainly cocaine and marijuana (R 777-779) , and also 
admits to the fact that he plead not guilty by reason of 
insanity. (R 780). 
Brad Bromage, denies most everything in regard to his 
drug dealings, even though he is granted immunity from the 
State. He further denies that he went out to Piti's house 
impersonating a police officer when faced with the testimony 
of Pairat Snook. And lastly, Lloyd Averett1s testimony 
should be entirely discounted, after the prosecution made 
reference to the kind of guy, Lloyd Averett, their own 
witness was. Even the State does not have much faith in 
Lloyd Averettfs character. 
When taking the evidence as presented to the jury in 
the form of the testimony of Brad Bromage, Jim Averett, and 
Jim Smith, and even when looking at such evidence in the 
light most favorable to upholding the conviction as in the 
law Newbold and Home. This Court must recognize that the 
evidence is so inconclusive that a reasonable mind would, of 
necessity, have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the 
defendant. 
Apparently, the jury rested their decision upon the 
testimony of these three characters. The jury's reliance 
upon this testimony is misplaced, not only because of the 
discrepancies in their testimony, but the inherent reasons 
for their apparent motives by testifying falsely against the 
defendant in that it would be them that would be charged 
with the murder of Srisa-ad. 
Point VI 
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING IMMUNITY WAS PATENTLY IMPROPER AND 
PREJUDICIAL 
When the prosecutor misstated the evidence concerning 
the immunity granted to Brad Bromage in regard to the murder 
of Piti Srisa-ad, the misstatement vested Bromage testimony 
with greater credibility. 
Such misstatements being made in the rebuttal phase of 
closing arguments places the Defendant in the posture of 
either objecting to such statement and calling even more 
attention to it or not objecting and hoping such 
misstatement would not influence the jury. 
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The Defendant recognizes the generally recognized rule 
that an objection is necessary unless such misconduct is so 
fundamental that Defendant cannot be assured a fail trial. 
In the instant proceeding the credibility of Bromage 
was a primary issue and making him more credible contrary to 
the evidence is of such a fundamental nature that the lower 
Court should have granted Defendant a new trial upon Motion 
by the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Defendant 
respectfully asks the Court to reverse his conviction and 
grant the Defendant a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/l4th^&*ry of October, 1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD S. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 17655 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION N 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
You have been selected and sworn as the jury to try the 
case of STATE OF UTAH vs. RICHARD S. JOHNSON. 
This is a criminal case. Defendant is charged with the 
crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital felony. The 
elements of that crime will be explained to you later. 
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the 
Information. The State, therefore, has the burden of proving 
each of the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is" your solemn responsibility to determine if the 
State has proved its accusation beyond a reasonable doubt 
against the defendant. Your verdict must be based solely on the 
evidence, or lack of evidence, and the law. 
The accusing document is called an "Information". The 
Information is not evidence, and it is not to be considered by 
you as any proof of guilt. 
It is the judge's responsibility to decide which laws 
apply to this case and to explain those laws to you. It is your 
responsibility to decide what the facts of this case may be, and 
to apply the law to those facts. Thus, the province of the jury 
and the province of the court are well defined, and.tj^ ey do not 
overlap. This is one of the fundamental principles of our 
system of justice. 
Before proceeding further, it might be helpful if you 
understand how a trial is conducted. 
At the beginning of the trial, the lawyers will have an 
opportunity, if they wishf to make an opening statement. The 
opening statement gives the lawyers a chance to tell you what 
evidence they believe will be presented during the trial. What 
the lawyers say is not evidence, and you are not to consider it 
as such. 
Following the opening statements, witnesses will be 
called to testify under oath. They will be examined and 
cross-examined by the lawyers. Documents and other exhibits 
also may be produced as evidence. 
After the evidence has been presentedr the Court will 
instruct you on the law applicable to the case. Following the 
Court's instructions on the law, the lawyers will have the 
opportunity to make their closing arguments. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. <^~~ 
During the trial I will be required to make rulings 
about the evidence. The rulings I make about the evidence are 
law questions and they are my sole responsibility. You should 
be very careful not to allow yourselves to be influenced by my 
rulings. If I receive evidence after it is objected to by one 
of the lawyers, that only means that you may have that evidence 
for your consideration. What weight or value you place upon it 
is still for you to determine. 
You must not disfavor a lawyer who makes a legal 




Our laws and constitution require you to presume the 
innocence of a person accused of a crime. You must persevere in 
this presumption unless and until the prosecutor has proved the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. So long as a 
reasonable doubt exists, you must find the defendant "not 
guilty". This presumption of innocence is binding upon you and 
may not be disregarded by youf but may be overcome only by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption is intended to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being punished. 
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INSTRUCTION NO • ± 
You are to determine what witness to believe and what 
parts of their testimony you believe and what weight or value 
you place upon the testimony of the various witnesses. In 
making these determinations, you might like to consider some or 
all of the following: 
the demeanor and deportment of the witness in 
the courtroom; 
the witness1 interest in the result of the 
trial; 
any tendency to favor or disfavor one side or 
the other; 
the probability or improbability of events 
having occurred the way the witness describes 
the events; 
was the witness actually able to see or hear or 
otherwise perceive the things described; 
can this witness now accurately recall the 
things the witness observed; 
is the witness able to describe what he 
observed accurately and in a form that you can 
understand; 
did the witness make earlier statements or 
expressions which are consistent or inconsis-
tent with what is now being said; 
does the witness speak the truth or not. 
But whatever tests you use, the value of a witness1 
testimony is for you to determine. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Now that you have heard the evidencer it becomes my duty 
to give you the instructions of the court as to the law 
applicable to this case. 
It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in 
the instructions of the courtf and to apply the rules of law so 
given to the facts as you find them from the evidence in the 
case. 
Justice throughout the trial by jury must always depend 
upon the willingness of each individual juror to seek the truth 
as to the facts from the same evidence presented to all the 
jurors; and to arrive at a verdict by applying the same rules of 
lawf as given in the instructions of the court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. (p 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREEf a capital felonyf you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1) That the said defendant, Richard S. Johnson, 
2) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
another, 
3) under either or both of the following 
circumstances: 
a) the defendant committed, or engaged or 
employed another person to commit the 
homicide pursuant to an agreement or 
contract for remuneration or the promise of 
remuneration for the commission of the 
homicide; or 
b) the homicide was committed for pecuniary or 
other personal gain. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
said elements, you should consider whether or not the defendant 
is guilty of the lesser included offense as outlined in the 
following instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
If you come to the conclusion that the State has not 
proven the defendant guilty of the offense of MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, then you should consider 
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the lesser included 
offense of MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a first degree felony, 
the elements of which are as follows: 
1) That the said defendantr Richard S. Johnson, 
2) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
another. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
said elements, you should consider whether or not the defendant 
is guilty of the lesser included offense as outlined in the 
following instruction. 
A 4 O 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
II you com*-: to i:he concl u$>: o\> thM I he State hun not 
proven the dcM-ncLn : - i ' \ (-\\r< i i /< KJJ" ' j THE 
S E C O N D D E G R E E , a first d e g r e e felony, t.hnn you should consider 
wl letl ie:i: or i lot tl le defendant is gui I r y of nu. lesser included 
offense of MANSLAUGHTER, a second degi *•* M-L.-?:•/, * - uri.M;!: )f 
which are as foil ows: 
"J That the said defendant, Richard '.'. Johnson, 
-••=.- reckles '" --. • .= . or another; 
and/or 
b) caused the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse. 
If you be]ieve that the evidence establishes each and 
all of th\ essential elements of . .. • . t.cr.:-;c- U L ^ . * ar.u11a 1 J i 
doubt, -t <-• y^ui out y to ronvict the defendant. ;,i, -To other 
hand, '=fir f f- • 10 establish o;p- or moie oi 
said e l e m e n t s , < ou *;h.)iiln iind the defendant no 1 , i rv. 
': J -t 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ /_ 
Vi}\(-\ • . S t a t e c h a i ^ t : i i a d e f e n d a n t w i t h 
Homicide, i iuidoi in l*he F i r s t Degree , -1 i tHi i.n^ i* 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a l l t w e l v e of flu. -ji-toif; IUULJI. agree 
a 11ei:na 1 :i ve ci i:ci 11 nst;-rr*r- : • • r s t a n c e . 
State alleges two alternative c M cuuu. i .'inces for 
Homicidef Murdei * • .1 - Degree, n-od not pi 
alternative ci ronus- ,HM << . 
alternative circumstances beyond : reasonable doui«t 
1 11 1 a 1 ii 1 nous satisfaction of all twelve jurors. 
INSTRUCTIC 
Whei i i t appears 1:1: i a t: 
p u b l i c o f f e n s e and t h e r e i s a 
• .. . . i'-ni e e s he i s oui .1 
lowoi u\ jiiu.n u<jcjrees o n l y . 
N NO. Xz_ 
1:1 l e dc * P I M K : ' • • - ' , . ' i r f l a 
r e a s o n a b l e doubt: ,ir> ;. winch of 
t"vf he must be c o n v i c t e d u ; t ; ie 
14 o 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
P i: o o f b e y o i i d a r e a s o i 1 a b ] e d o 1 1 b t i s 11 i a t d e g r e e c f p i: o o f 
t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h e mind and c o n v i n c e s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h o s e 
wh< <>i e bound t o a c t c o n s r i e n t i o u s l y upon ~^ must a r i s e 
from Uie e v i d e n c e ^r l a r k * * o^' idencp in f1 > ,.*-. 
If f a f t e r an i m p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n - compar i son of 
• •
 r LticiL j .. a r e n o t 
s a t i s f i e d of MM- defendan t ' . * . u i . l , * - . . ^ v e a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; 
but if f a* t o r snrh i mpa r t i a 1 c o n s i d e r a t i o n and compari.'-oi: of a] 1 
t h e ( v i u'- . : : ; ' • i s ' ' * .g 
c o n v i c t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i i l .\,ucn as you v.uula oo M x . a i g 
t o a c t upon iii t h e more w e i g h t y and i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s r e l a t i i i g 
t o your own af f a i r s
 f you have i :io r easoi iab 1 e •••doubt • 
INSTRUCTION NO. /* 
The law does not require demonstration of that degree 
of proof whicl 1, excludii ig all possibility of error . produces 
absolute certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely possible.
 s 
Only that degree of proof is necessary wli-c'u convinces l.n .iind 
and directs and satisfies the conscience • i i!iu:- : ; • /:d 
to act conscientiously upon it. 
A 4 ( ; 
INSTRUCTION NO. /J> 
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings, 
material objects, or anything presented to the senses and 
offered to prove the existence or non-existence of a fact. 
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial. 
DIRECT EVIDENCE is evidence that directly proves a 
fact, without the necessity of an inference, and which by 
itself, if found to be true/ establishes that fact. 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is evidence that, if found to 
be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence 
of another fact may be drawn. 
An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically 
and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts 
established by the evidence. 
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct 
evidence. They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence or 
by a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. Both 
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a 
means of proof. Neither is entitled to any greater weight than 
the other. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / L 
A finding of guilt as to any crime may be based on 
circumstantial evidence when the proved circumstances are 1) 
consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the 
crime; and 2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational 
conclusion. 
Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set 
of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt* In other wordsf 
before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to 
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or 
circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Also, if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of 
two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the 
defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your 
duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the 
defendant's innocence, and reject that interpretation which 
points to his guilt. 
If, on the other hand, one interpretation of such 
evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other 
interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to 
accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the 
unreasonable. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In these instructions certain words and phrases are 
used which require definition in order that you may properly 
understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that 
you may properly apply the law as contained in these 
instructions to the facts as you may find them from the 
evidence. These definitions are as follows: 
The term "knowingly" or "with knowledge" means a person 
acts with respect to his conduct when he is aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowinglyf or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally" or "with 
intent" or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct 
or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. 
A person engages in conduct "recklessly", or 
maliciously, with respect to the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In the crime charged in this case the law requires that 
the defendant harbor a certain mental state at the time of his 
actions which are claimed to be unlawful. The mental state 
required with respect to the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE/ a capital felony, is that the defendant intended to cause 
or knowingly caused the death of Piti Srisa-Ad. 
In every crime or public offense there must be a union 
or joint operation of act and intent. The intent or intention is 
manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense and 
the sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /^7 
You are instructed that voluntary intoxication shall 
not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of . 
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence 
establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of 
the risk because of voluntary intoxication/ his awareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in 
the case. When, however, the attorneys on both sides stipulate 
or agree as to the existence of a fact, the jury must, unless 
otherwise instructed, accept the stipulation and regard that fact 
as proved. 
Unless you are otherwise instructed, the evidence in the 
case always consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, 
regardless of who may have called them; and all exhibits received 
in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them; and all 
facts which may have been admitted or stipulated. 
Any evidence as to which an objection was sustained by 
the Court, and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court, must 
be entirely disregarded. 
Unless you are otherwise instructed, anything you may 
have seen or heard outside of the courtroom is not evidence, and 
must be entirely disregarded. 
^ TT A 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should 
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where 
the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and 
must determine from the evidence what the facts are. There are 
no definite rules governing how you shall determine the weight or 
convincing force of any evidence or how you shall determine what 
the facts in this case are. But you should carefully and 
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and 
determine therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to 
believe all that the witnesses have testified to or any witness 
or class of witnesses and circumstances in evidence. You may 
believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer 
number in accordance with your honest convictions. The testimony 
of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter is 
naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a 
witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact 
in this case you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such 
witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it is 
entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ° 
The defendant has been sworn and testified as a witness 
in his own behalf. This is his right, and his testimony should 
not be rejected or discredited by you simply because he is the 
defendant and on trial for a criminal charge, but you should 
consider and weigh his testimony the same as the testimony of the 
other witnesses and determine the weight and credibility to be 
given thereto by the same rules given you herein concerning the 
weight and credibility to be given to the testimony of the 
witnesses generally. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education in a particular science, profession or 
occupation may give his opinion as an expert as to any matter in 
which he is skilled. In determining the weight to be given such 
opinion you should consider the qualifications and credibility of 
the expert and the reasons given for his opinion. You are not 
bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you 
deem it entitled. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2"^-
A witness may be discredited or "impeached" by 
contradictory evidence, by a showing that he testified falsely 
concerning a material matter, or by evidence that at some other; 
time the witness has said or done something, or has failed to say 
or do something, which is inconsistent with the witness1 present 
testimony. 
If you believe that any witness has been so impeached, 
then it is your exclusive province to give the testimony of that 
witness such credibiity or weight, if any, as you may think it 
deserves. 
•4 r o 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The constitution and laws of this state prohibit the 
trial judge from making any comment about the witnesses or the 
evidence, and I am not allowed to assist you in determining your 
verdict. 
Therefore, you are instructed that if during this trial 
I have said or done anything which has suggested that I favor 
the claims or position of either party, you are not to permit 
yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. 
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which 
witnesses are, or are not, worthy of belief, nor which party 
should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to 
indicate an opinion relative to any of these matters, you must 
disregard it. 
INSTRUCTION NO •2M-
These instructions contain the law that governs you in 
this case. In determining the facts, you may consider only the 
evidence given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me 
or ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you. 
Not one of these instructions states all of the law of 
this case, but all of them must be taken and considered together 
inasmuch as they are connected with and relate to each other. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You should discuss the case and try to reach agreement, 
but nonetheless each party to this case has a right to your 
individual judgment. You should not surrender your honest 
convictions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or 
solely because of the opinions of other jurors, but you should 
not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is 
erroneous. 
1 G 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one 
of your number as foreman. Your verdict must be in writing, 
signed by your foreman, and when found, must be returned by you 
into court. 
Your verdict in this case must be: 
GUILTY of the offense of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a 
capital felony, as charged in the Information; or 
GUILTY of the lesser included offense of MURDER IN THE 
SECOND DEGREE, a first degree felony; or 
GUILTY of the lesser included offense of MANSLAUGHTER, 
a second degree felony; or 
NOT GUILTY; as your deliberations may result. 
This being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous 
concurrence of all jurors to find a verdict. 
K 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The bailiff will now escort you to the jury room and 
you may commence your deliberations. You should first choose a 
foreman as your presiding officer. The foreman should sign 
whatever verdict you agree upon. When you have agreed and the 
verdict has been signedf notify the bailiff that you have 
agreed, but do not reveal the verdict to him. The foreman shall 
keep the verdict in his possession until I instruct you 
otherwise. All of you must agree to the same verdict in a 
criminal case. 
DATED this day of November, 1986. 
1G3 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
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The undersigned Complainant upon oath states that the Complainant has reason to believe that 
the above named Defendant on or about the. 
Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
16 t h 
. day of- Mav , 19 . a n 
;-\"- \\\ . 
to-wit: 
as follows:* 
Mt.".o*i o r c h ; ;.rorr«.irja o f r e ^ u / i e r ^ i ; j .ou .co.r; c o / r a i i s s i o i : o f the 
r# l i l t h o m i c i d e v/as coi i i inl t ted, f o r ? > e c u n i a r v o r o t h e r p e r s o n a l 
This information is based on evidence 
obtained from the following witnesses: 
,.-h*'\:.' .vij.L^OrCf CPU 
i w \ i 'OKAli, HVPD 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
COUNTY ATTORNE 
B y l 
rwPTrrv . Lui-jX UA 
A, ,-^ *o-
y£ 
BIIIiNT" -y\ U T I F 
Case No. 3 6- 1 7 1 1 1 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
. day of _ 19 
3 # '. • 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Weber County, Utah 
